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A

SIMPLE THOUGHT-EXPERIMENT: TURING GAMES
WITH A UNIFIED CODE OF PROCEDURE

F.E.

GUERRA-PUJOL* & SYDJIA TmlANE ROBINSON**

Over the years legal scholars and judicial commissions in India have noted
that the most pervasive and 'pathological' problem afflicting India's legal
system is the problem of judicial delay. Indeed, the situation remains the
same at present with there being little hope of change. The abovementioned
commissions made recommendations to alleviate the situation,but few have
proposedsystemic solutions to this problem. Building on the previouswork
of one of the authors, in this paper the authors propose a novel thought
experiment for solving the problem of delay: the use of 'Turing litigation
games4 based on a simple and unified code of procedurefor both civil and
criminal cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, legal scholars and judicial commissions in India have
consistently and repeatedly noted that the most pervasive and "pathological"
problem afflicting India's legal system is the problem of judicial delay,' but few
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have proposed systemic solutions to this problem. In this paper, we propose a
novel thought experiment for solving the problem of delay: the use of 'Turing
litigation games' based on a simple and unified code of procedure for both civil
and criminal cases.
This paper is organised as follows. Following this introduction, Section I
reviews the problem of delay in India's legal system. Section 2 provides a brief
survey of the problem; Section Ii(A) summarises some previous diagnoses of the
problem and explains why these previous explanations are off the mark; and Section
II(B) then presents an alternative diagnosis of the problem of delay in India -in
summary, the main sources of arrears in India are India's complex, formalistic,
and open-ended codes of civil and criminal procedure. Section III then presents a
novel solution to the problem of delay: a simple and streamlined 'Unified Code of
Procedure' for civil and criminal cases alike. Next, building on the work of GuerraPujol,2 Section IV proposes the use of'Turing litigation games' for the adjudication
of civil and criminal cases, and Section V concludes.

I.

THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

India's legal system operates on three levels: (i) a single Supreme Court at
the federal level; (ii) High Courts in each of the States; and, at the local level, (iii)
district judges for civil cases and session judges for criminal cases3 Most scholars
and lawyers alike agree that the most pervasive and systemic problem afflicting all
three levels of India's legal system is the problem of judicial delay 4 For example,
in the understated words of one scholar, "the speed of the judiciaryhas been identified

as a key problem in India",5 or in the more eloquent and poignant words of another
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India in Jean-Jacques Dethier, GOVERNANCE, DECENTRALIZATION AND REFORM IN CIuNA,
INDIA AND RUSSIA, 345 (2000); see also, Joseph Minattur, INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM ( 2 nd edn.,
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respected scholar, "that the courts [in India] have large arrearsand that the law's delays
virtually result in the denialof justice is common knowledge".6
The problem of delay in India's legal system is not only a pervasive and
pathological problem; it is also an enduring one. The Law Commission of India and
several other official ad hoc committees have consistently identified the problems
of overload and arrears over the years, including the Law Commission's Seventy
Seventh Report titled Delay and Arrears in Trial Courts,7 which was preceded by
its Fourteenth Report titled Reform of JudicialAdministration,8 which in turn was
preceded by a previous report published in 1949 by the High Court Arrears
Committee.9
Consider, for example, the report published in 1972 by the High Court
Arrears Committee led by the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India,
Jayantilal Chhotalal Shah (the Shah Committee Report)." This report provides
a comprehensive diagnosis of the main sources of judicial delay in India's legal
system and recommends a number of reforms to address the problem." But forty
years later, in spite of numerous reports and numerous studies, the problem of
delay is just as pervasive and pathological as it was in the past. To get some idea
of the sheer magnitude and scope of the problem, consider the official 2002 report
titled Law's Delays: Arrears in Court12 According to this report, in 2000 there were
3.1 million pending cases in 21 High Courts and 20 million pending cases in
3
subordinate courts.'
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S.P. Sathe, Crisis of Indian legal system 18(32)
1389 (1983).
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Law Commission of India, 77" REPORT-DELAY AND ARREARS IN TRIAL COURTS (1978).
Law Commission of India, 14"' REPORT-REFORM OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1958).
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58-59 (1982).
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For a summary of the findings and recommendations of the 1972 Shah report, see, Baxi,
supra note 9, at chapter 3.
Law Commission of India, 85" REPORT - LAW'S DELAYS: ARREARS IN COURT (2002).
Id.
For a more dramatic picture of the delay problem, consider further the 2006-2008
Biennial Report of the High Court of Delhi (2009) in which Chief Justice A.P. Shah
admitted that "it would take [the High Court in New DelhiI approximately 466 years"
to clear all its pending cases. High Court Spends Just Over Four Minutes on Each
Case in Tim HINDU (Feb. 12, 2009), available at: http://www.hindu com/2009/02/12/
stories/2009021253190400.htm (Last visited on 30 July 2013).
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A. Mistaken or Incorrect Diagnosesof the Problem of Delay
The leading survey of India's legal system is still Upendra Baxi's The Crisis
of the Indian Legal System)

4

In his classic work, Professor Baxi identifies a number

of 'antimonies and contradictions' in the Indian legal system15 and devotes an
entire chapter to the problem of judicial overload and arrears. But thirty years
after Professor Baxi published his landmark book, and forty years after India's
High Court Arrears Committee, led by Justice Shah, published its special report
on the problem of delay, the problems of overload and arrears continue to plague
India's legal system (and many other legal systems as well).
So, what is the source of this problem? Building on the work of the 1972
Shah Committee Report, Professor Baxi identifies four separate factors or sources
of delay in India's legal system: "(i) State caused delays, (ii) court caused delays; (iii)
Bar causeddelays; and (iv) litigantcaused delays"2 6 Nevertheless, as we shall explain
17
below, these diagnoses of the problem of delay are weak and unpersuasive.
First, Professor Baxi diagnoses 'State caused delays'." Specifically, he notes
that "the state ... has surprisinglymade no realisticassessment of the judicial manpower
needed to maintainan efficient and a just justice administration".)9 In other words, there
simply aren't enough judges and research staff to adjudicate the large volume of
cases in India's legal system. In addition, Professor Baxi condemns the 'quality'
of judges2O and holdups in the judicial appointments process.2 These diagnoses,
however, are superficial at best for two reasons, First, the relation between quality
and speed is not obvious: a high-quality judge may very well take more time to
decide cases on average than a low-quality judge. Likewise, the relation between
the number of judges and the incidence of delay is also not obvious. Simply put,
"more" is not necessarily better than "less" because an increase in the quality and
number of judges and in the number of courts may in turn lead to an increase in

14

Baxi, supra note 9.

15

For a succinct summary of these "antimonies and contradictions," see, Sathe, supra
note 6, at 1388-1389.

16
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Baxi, supra note 9, at 64.
For exceptions to such diagnoses, see e.g., Chemin, supra note 5; Debroy, supra note 3.
Baxi, supra note 9, at 65-68.
Baxi supranote 9, at 66.
Baxi supranote 9, at 65-66.
Baxi supra note 9, at 65.
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the number of claims.2' That is, an increase in the supply of justice may produce
an increase in the demand for justice, producing no net reduction in the incidence
of delay or backlogs.
Next, Professor Baxi diagnoses 'court caused delays'2 3 including 'corrupt
and improper' conduct by judges,24 the lack of modern 'court management'
5
procedures,2
and other 'intangible factors' contributing to judicial backlogs and
26
delay. In addition, Professor Baxi notes that the expansive interpretation of their
jurisdiction by the various High Courts of India under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and under Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution has led
to large increases in the judicial workload.22 But, once again, these diagnoses are
unpersuasive and superficial. The relation between delay and workload is not so
straightforward: busier courts may in fact be faster courts. Furthermore, evidence
of judicial 'corruption' (however defined) is still mostly anecdotal, and since the
publication of the 1972 Shah Committee Report and Professor Baxi's classic book in
1982, most courts in India have adopted modern 'case management' protocols and
implemented a state-of-the-art 'e-courts' project-to no avail, however. In spite of
these significant reforms, the problem of arrears appears to be as pervasive as ever.
Another major source of delay in India's legal system is 'legal profession
caused delays'2. In essence, cunning lawyers use delay as a litigation tactic: lawyers
thus compound and contribute to the problem of arrears by bending or gaming the
rules of procedure to gain an undue advantage or extort a favourable settlement.
Also, lawyers in India supposedly have a tendency to 'over-prove' essential
allegations29 and their "arguments often tend to be unduly prolix"," But, yet again,
these diagnoses are weak and unpersuasive. Prolixity and over-argumentation
are true of lawyers in all legal systems (not just Indian lawyers), and lawyers in
all legal systems will always find ways of gaming the rules of procedure to delay
cases, especially when such delaying tactics benefit the interests of their clients.

22
23
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Robert Moog, Delays in the Indian courts: Why the Judges Don't Take Control 16(1) JUsTIcE
SYSTEM JOURNAL 19, 22-25 (1992).
Baxi. supra note 9, at 68.
Baxi, supra note 9, at 69.
Baxi, supra note 9, at 69.
Baxi, supra note 9, at 69.
Baxi, supra note 9, at 70-71.
Baxi, supra note 9, at 74-77.
Baxi supranote 9, 75.
Baxi supranote 9, 75.
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Last but not least, Professor Baxi diagnoses 'litigant caused delays'.'! Professor
Baxi notes that "the volume of litigation[in India]has been steadily rising"since India's
independence,3 2 and many legal commentators in India believe that 'litigant caused
delays' or the high rate of case filings are the most important causes of delay in
India's legal system. 33 Furthermore, Professor Baxi poses a series of sociological
questions:But if Indians are litigious ... why are they so? Is it because some
Indians love litigation for its own sake? ... Or does greater litigiousness
show an increasing rights-consciousness and access to law? ... Or, is
it that courts are resorted to not so much to secure relief or vindicate
rights but rather with the objective of harassing the adversary?
But with all due respect to Professor Baxi, who we greatly admire, these
questions are beside the point. After all, are Indians really any more litigious,
'rights-conscious', or strategic than litigants in other legal systems or the citizens
of other countries? In any given legal system (not just India's), some fraction of
litigants will indeed be litigious, right-conscious, or strategic. But this fact, standing
alone, does not explain the problem of delay in India's legal system.
In our view, we should be asking a different set of questions: why do civil
cases and criminal cases have different codes of procedure - that is, why do most
legal systems (including India's) perpetuate a 'civil-criminal divide' - and why
are India's civil and criminal codes of procedure so complex, formalistic, and
open-ended?
B. AnAlternative Diagnosisof the Problem of Delay
Here, we present an alternative diagnosis of the enduring problem of overload
and arrears in India's legal system. In summary, the main source of judicial delay
in India is India's complex, formalistic, and open-ended codes of civil and criminal
procedure. Simply put, the problem of arrears in India is mostly procedural in
nature - the codes of civil and criminal procedure in India are far too complex,
formalistic, and open-ended.- Thus, in contrast to the traditional diagnoses of
31
32
33
34
35

Baxi, supra note 9, at 77-78.
Baxi, supra note 9, at 77.
See e.g., Sathe, supra note 6, at 1389 where he states that "The most important cause of the
delays [in India's legal sLstem] is the volume of litigation".
Baxi, supra note 9, at 78.
C f. Chemin, supra note 5, who offers empirical evidence in support of claim. See also,
Debroy, supra note 3, at 343.
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delay presented in section 2 above, 6 our hypothesis is that the problem of delay
in India is mostly a function of the codes of procedure; in particular, arrears are a
function of (i) procedural complexity, (ii)procedural accretion, and (iii) procedural
ambiguity.
Consider the issue of procedural complexity first. The codes of civil and
criminal procedure in India are highly complex and sophisticated legal documents
consisting of thousands of rules and millions of words. India's Code of Criminal
Procedure, for example, contains a total of 37 thematic 'Chapters' (and 22 additional
sub-chapters) and no less than 484 separate 'sections' containing thousands of
specific procedural rules. The 'Table of Contents' of the Code of Criminal Procedure
spans 18 single-spaced pages by itself.37 Likewise, India's Code of Civil Procedure
is divided into two parts: 11 general 'sections' (consisting of 158 general guidelines
and rules spanning over 40 single-spaced pages of text), and 51 detailed 'orders'
(consisting of thousands of specific rules spanning over 100 single-spaced pages
of text). In short, the codes of civil and criminal procedure in India are two of the
most prolix and complex procedural codes in the world.
Next, consider the issue of procedural formality and the steady and gradual
accretion of new amendments to the codes of procedure in India. For instance,
section 122 in Part X of the Code of Civil Procedure authorises the High Courts
to amend the procedures set forth in the orders of the Code (recall that the orders
appear in the second part of the Code of Civil Procedure). From 1971 to 1996, the
High Courts made 430 formal amendments to the orders. 38According to Matthieu
Chemin,3 9 94 of these formal amendments during this span of time were 'Court
red tape' amendments, that is, an amendment which added extra procedures to be
followed by the High Court making the amendment and thus most likely to affect
the expected duration of civil cases affected by the amendment. 0
Last, consider the issue of procedural ambiguity. Many provisions in
India's codes of civil and criminal procedure are so open-ended and ambiguous

36
37

38
39
40

Cf. Baxi, supra note 9, at chapter 3.
UNIVERSAL'S CRIMINAL MANUAL containingCODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1973 (Feb.,
2013)
Chemin, supranote 5, at 2 and 12.
Chemin, supra note 5, at 12-13 & Figure I therein.
According to Chemin, the net effect of these formal 'red tape' amendments was to
increase the expected duration of a High Court trial by 3.3 days. Chemin, supra note
5, at 24 28.
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that different High Courts have reached opposite and conflicting decisions in
similar cases." For example, the 14 4th Report of the Law Commission of India,
titled Conflicting Judicial Decisions Pertainingto the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(the Singh report),"' presents a total of 30 different procedural rules in the civil
procedure code producing 163 conflicting decisions by different High Courts in
India." According to Chemin," such conflicting judicial decisions contribute to
the problem of judicial delay because judges must spend more time in choosing
among conflicting precedents within the same High Court (ie. in choosing among
conflicting interpretations of the same ambiguous procedural rule).
To sum up, the main sources of judicial delay in India's legal system are
India's complex, formalistic, and open-ended codes of civil and criminal procedure.
These complex codes consist of thousands of procedural rules and millions of
words, continue to expand and grow through a steady and gradual process of
accretion, and contain many open-ended and ambiguous provisions. It should
come as no surprise, then, that India's legal system suffers from so much overload
and arrears. Furthermore, our diagnosis of the problem of delay raises a larger
question: why do common law legal systems still have separate rules of procedure
for civil and criminal cases?

III. SOLUTION: A

UNIFIED CODE OF PROCEDURE

Does the problem of delay defy solution? Is it an intractable or insoluble
problem? What is to be done?
In Professor Baxi's words: "this is the time for experimentation and innovation,
unless we want the crisis of the [Indianlegal system] to continue". '5 He goes on to say:'
The crisis of the [Indian legal system] cannot be handled by just
tinkering with the outer peripheries of the justice system. The
problems raised by arrears are problems whose scope transcends the
court system itself ...
Perhaps, nothing short of a total transformation
41
42

See, e.g., Chemin, supra note 5, at 7-11 and Figure III therein.

Law Commission of India, 144-

M

REPORT- CONFLICTING JUDICIAL DEcIsIoNS PERTAINING

TO TM CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1908

43
44
45
46

(1992).

For an example of a procedural rule producing opposing High Court decisions, see,
Chemin, supra note 5, at 9-10.
Chemin, supra note 5, at 25-26.
Baxi, supra note 9, at 81.
Baxi, supra note 9,at 83.
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is needed if we are even to begin to "solve" these problems. That is
why the crisis of the [Indian legal system] also presents substantial
opportunities for its reconstruction.
In other words, what the Indian legal system needs is "a thorough restructuring
- and not mere tinkering here and there" .4
Here, we take up Professor Baxi's bold call for reconstruction, experimentation,
and innovation. Specifically, we propose the following thought-experiment: what
if we were to abolish the existing complex codes of civil and criminal procedure
wholesale and then replace the old common law system with a more simple and
streamlined 'Unified Code of Procedure'.
Although our proposed solution may sound strange and unfamiliar at first,
but in substance and spirit, our thought-experiment is more consistent with the
timeless wisdom and early legal traditions of ancient India - far more so than the
transplanted Anglo-American 'common law' model is. Consider, for example, the
ancient Arthashastraand other writings of the philosopher Kautilya, a contemporary
of Aristotle and one of India's (and the world's) greatest universal thinkers.48
The Arthashastrais divided into 15 Books and addresses general questions of
governance, social relations, and political economy. 9 In particular, Book III, titled
'Concerning Law', is devoted to law and justice, and the subjects of the first chapter
of Book III are the 'determination of forms of agreement' and the 'determination
of legal disputes', that is, contracts and trial procedure.
It is thus revealing that Book III of the ancient Arthashastranot only begins
with legal procedure (i.e. 'determination of legal disputes') but also proposes a
simple and unified set of procedural rules for the adjudication of such disputes.
Specifically, legal complaints are lodged by aggrieved private parties and are then

47
48

49

50

Sathe, supranote 6, at 1393.
See, e.g., Charles Waldauer, William J. Zahka, and Surendra Pal, Kautilya'sArthashastra:
a Neglected Precursorto ClassicalEconomics 31(1) INDIAN ECONOMIC RVIEW 101 (1996);
Radhakrishna Choudhary, KAUTILYA'S POLrTICAL IDEAS AND INSTITUrIONS (1971). For
an English translation of the ancient Arthashastra, see, R. Shamasastry, KAUTILYA'S
ARTHASIHASTRA (81h edn., 1956).
R.K, Sen, and R.L. Basu, EcONOMICS IN ARTHASASTRA (2006).
R.P. Kangle observes, "it seems that the law of procedure and the law of evidence were first
framed in connectionwith suits concerning the non-payment of debts" because "the debt was the
most ancient and most commonform of[casel .. " RP. Kangle, TiE KAUTILYA ARTHASHASTRA,
Vol. 3, 217-18 (2nd edn., 1997).
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brought before a judge, who then puts questions to the parties and records their
replies. 1 Most importantly, the ancient Arthashastramakes no distinction between
civil cases and criminal cases,

IV. A NOVEL

THOUGHT-EXPERIMENT FOR SIMPLIFYING

THE CODES OF PROCEDURE AND FOR BRIDGING
THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DIVIDE
Ideally, if we could neglect the constraints of custom, path dependence,
and politics, we would 'start from scratch' and propose an alternative and totally
new system of civil and criminal adjudication. Specifically, we would propose
a simplified and openly probabilistic procedural system resembling the 'Turing
Test' or 'Imitation Game', 52 a well-known test of artificial intelligence proposed
by the computer scientist Alan Turing in 1950. The Turing Test has generated
extensive commentary in the fields of computer science, artificial intelligence, and
the philosophy of mind,- and as we explain below, the logic of the Turing Test is
also relevant to the legal process.
In brief, although the Turing Test was designed to test for the intelligence of
computer programs (that is, to answer the general question, 'can machines think?')
and was not designed to determine a particular defendant's civil or criminal
liability, we propose extending the Turing Test to law and apply a Turing-like
procedure to civil and criminal proceedings, but instead of testing for intelligence,
our system would 'test' for civil and criminal liability.
In his famous 1950 paper, the computer scientist Alan Turing described a
simple question-and-answer game, what he calls the 'imitation game',54 involving
three players: a man (Player A), a woman (Player B), and an interrogator (Player
C), who may be of either gender. In summary, the interrogator is allowed to put
questions in writing to players A and B,and based on the responses provided by A
51
52
53

For a summary of the procedural system in the ancient Art hashastra,see, Kangle, supra
note 50, at 215-231.
Alan Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence 41 MIND 433 (1950).
See generally, Graham Oppy, and David Dowe, The Turing Test in Edward N. Zalta
(ed.), TmE STANFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA oF PHILOSOPHY, (Spring 2010 edn.), available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-test/ (Last visited on 30 July2013), and sources
therein.

54

Turing, supra note 52, at 433.

55

Turing, supra note 52, at 433.
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and B, the interrogator must guess their true identities, or in Turing's words, "the
object of the gamefor the interrogatoris to determinewhich of the other two is the man and
which is the woman", while "the object of the game for third player fie. Player B, the
woman] is to help the interrogator".17Notice, then, that the object of the other player

in Turing's game - Player A, the man - is to deceive or fool the interrogator about
the truth of his gender (and about the truth of the other player's gender as well).
Next, Turing proposes that the role of player A be played by a digital computer
("What will happen when a machine takes thepart ofA in this game?").- Now, according

to the 'standard interpretation' of the Turing Test,51 the role of the interrogator is
6
to determine which of the players is the person, and which is the computer. 0
Superficially, Turing's imitation game appears to be totally different from the
process of litigation in several ways. For instance, unlike most forms of civil and
criminal litigation, in which all the main 'players' (i.e. judge, jury, lawyers, and
parties) are present in the same room and communicate orally, in Turing's game
the players must remain in two separate rooms and must communicate with each
other in writing, either electronically or through an intermediary.61 Also, Turing's
imitation game resembles more an 'inquisitorial' system of adjudication than an
'adversarial' system, since it is the interrogator himself (or herself) - and not the
other players or their representatives - who formulates the questions and evaluates
the responses in the imitation game.
Nevertheless, despite these differences of form, the substantive parallels
between the imitation game and what we call the 'litigation game' (the process of
civil and criminal adjudication) are striking. First and foremost, consider the aim
of the interrogator in Turing's imitation game and the goal of the judge (or jury, as
the case may be) in litigation games. In essence, the goal of Turing's interrogator
is to determine the true identity or gender of the players, and likewise, the role of
the judge or jury in litigation games is to determine the guilt or innocence of the
56
57
58
59
60

61

Turing, supranote 52, at 433.
Turing, supra note 52, at 434.
Turing, supra note 52, at 434.
See, Oppy and Dowe, supra note 53, at 24.
An alternative, plausible interpretation of the Turing Test is that the computer must
pretend to play the role of a woman, but regardless of which interpretation of the
Turing Test is the 'true' or 'correct' one, this difference of interpretation does not affect
the merits of our proposal.
According to Turing, "the idealarnangementis to have a teleprintercommunicatingbetween
the two rooms"; in the alternative, Turing states that the questions and answers may be
transmitted by a neutral intermediary. fruing, supra note 52, at 433-434.
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defendant, that is, to determine whether the defendant has committed a 'wrongful
act' (regardless whether the wrongful act is classified as civil or criminal in nature).62
Another important similarity is the initial state of ignorance of the interrogator
and of the judge/jury in both types of games. Just as the interrogator in the imitation
game is ignorant of the other players' genders because he is unable to see either
A or B, the judge too is ignorant of the defendant's guilt or innocence at the start
of any given litigation game. That is, although the judge is physically able to see
the parties because they are present in the courtroom, he is unable to 'see' who is
telling the truth and thus does not know with certainty whether the defendant has
committed a wrongful act (even after the parties have testified, presented witnesses,
and offered evidence in support of their claims and defences).
Furthermore, what we call 'the problem of ignorance' is a central feature of
the imitation and litigation games. In essence, both games attempt to solve this
ignorance problem through a 'question-and-answer' format. In one game, the
questions are posed by an interrogator; in the other, they are posed by the parties
or their legal advocates. But the underlying purposes and methods of both games
are essentially the same: the interrogator (in the imitation game) and the judge/jury
(in litigation games) wish to move from their initial state of ignorance to a state
of knowledge (or, to be more precise, to a state of some level of knowledge), and
moreover, they do so by submitting questions to the other players (or by allowing
the players to submit questions to each other) and by evaluating the responses to the
questions, That is, the interrogator/judge/jury share the same goal (the movement
from ignorance to knowledge) and rely on the same methods to achieve this goal
(the 'question-and-answer' format),
Last but not least, yet another striking similarity is the presence of deception
and strategic behaviour in both the imitation game and in litigation games
generally. In brie, deception and strategic behaviour play a vital role in the Turing
Test because Player A's role in this game is to trick the interrogator into making
an incorrect decision. He thus has a built-in and outright incentive to lie to the
interrogator about his gender and the gender of Player B. Likewise, deception
and strategic behaviour play a vital role in civil and criminal proceedings as well.

62

As an aside, one may argue that juries and judges play other important roles as well,
such as "the task of persuading adversaries" or "the indispensable task of imagining an
altruistic order", see, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Foriand substance in privatelaw adjudication
89(8) HARVARD LAW Ri v.W 1685 (1976). In this paper however, we will focus on the trial
judge's first-order function; that of managing cases, conducting trials, and imposing
civil and criminal liability.

A Simple Thought-Experiment: Turing Games with a Unified Code of Procedure
Indeed, we would go further and say that litigation games are essentially exercises
in deception and strategic behaviour. 63
Accordingly, given these striking similarities between Turing's imitation
game and the process of adjudication, we would extend the Turing Test to law by
replacing the existing complex mass of rules of civil and criminal procedure with
a simple Turing-like procedure to "test" for civil and criminal liability.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the main goal of the litigation game
is to impose civil or criminal liability only on defendants who have committed
wrongful acts. The current procedural system, however, is a totally absurd and
costly way of achieving this goal because, under the current system, the parties
have a strong material incentive to withhold or distort the relevant evidence from
the other side.6 4 By contrast, what would happen if the Turing Test were applied
to civil and criminal litigation? That is, what if Player A were to assume the role
of the moving party (i.e. plaintiff or prosecutor), and Player B were to take on the
role of the defendant, and PlayerC, the judge? In summary, our proposed Turinglike procedure would work as follows:
Under our proposed system, the judge (Player C) would assume the role of
Turing's interrogator, and the parties would assume the role of Players A and B,
but instead of trying to guess the gender or species of the players, the interrogator
would try to guess whether Player B has committed a wrongful act. Our proposed
procedure, which we call the 'Turing Litigation Game', would proceed more or
less the same way as under the current system of litigation 6 In brief, civil plaintiffs
would submit their complaints to the interrogator/judge, and similarly, prosecutors
would also submit their criminal indictments to the interrogator. In addition, both
plaintiffs and prosecutors would be required to comply with existing service of
process requirements, and in the case of alleged wrongful acts consisting of violent
63

For example, plaintiffs often file frivolous claims or lawsuits with "negative expectedvalue". See, Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Suits with Negative Expected value 'n Pen'il NEWMAN,
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sources therein. Likewise, police often lie under oath to obtain search warrants, while
prosecutors routinely overcharge defendants to persuade them to plea bargain or turn
State's evidence. See, e.g., Mara Shalhoup, BMF i HE RIsE AND FALL OF BIU MeLCij AND
TE BLACK MAFIA FAMILY, 257-262 (2010).
See generally, Marc Galanter, Why the 'haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change 9 LAW AND SOcIETY REviEw 95 (1974).
Recall that, under the current system, civil plaintiffs have an incentive to bring 'negative
expected value' lawsuits, and prosecutors have an incentive to 'overcharge' defendants.
We shall spell out the details in a future paper to be titled coogle Law?
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crimes (e.g., murder, rape, and assault and battery), the plaintiff or prosecutor
may request the interrogator to order the arrest and detention of the defendant.
But here is where our proposed Turing Litigation Game reforms the current
system: instead of wasting precious time with pre-trial motions, responsive
pleadings, and with discovery, the interrogator would proceed immediately into
the 'trial stage' of the proceeding: he would be allowed to put any and all questions
to players A and B relating to the contents of the complaint or indictment. The
interrogator might consist of a single federal judge, a panel of judges, or a judge
and a number of citizen-jurors chosen completely at random. However the role
of the interrogator is chosen, the object of the litigation game for the interrogator
is to determine whether Player B has committed a wrongful act.
From the perspective of the players, the object of Player A is to persuade
the interrogator that Player B has committed a wrongful act, while the object of
Player B is to persuade the interrogator that Player A is wrong (either as a matter
of fact or a matter of law, or both, depending on the circumstances). Furthermore,
to avoid any hint of judicial bias or prejudice because of socio-economic status
or race or gender of the parties (Players A and B), the interrogator would stay in
a separate room apart from the other two players (like the original Turing Test),
and all communications between the interrogator and the players would occur
electronically (again, just like the original Turing Test).
Now, to push our analogy to the Turing Test further, imagine if the role of
Player C, the interrogator, were played by a computer, a truly neutral umpire
or referee, free of political, economic, or moral biases. But, is such a computer/
interrogator plausible or even possible? We think this is an important and
worthwhile problem, and we would propose that the Loebner Prize, an annual
competition for implementing the Turing Test," be extended to include our
proposed Turing litigation game. That is, in addition to designing a computer
program able to pass the Turing Test, contestants would try to design a computer
program able to play the role of the interrogator in the Turing litigation game.
In the alternative, a new competition could be created to accomplish this goal.67
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See, Hugh Gene Loebner, In Response 37(6) COMMUNICATIONS

79-82 (1994).
As an aside, if the authors were independently wealthy, we would fund such a
competition ourselves. Since we are not so wealthy, we call on a private foundation,
university, or public institution, such as the National Science Foundation, to fund our
proposed competition.
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A Simple Thought-Experiment: Turing Games with a Unified Code of Procedure
We recognise that our proposed Turing Litigation Game, like the original
Turing Test itself, is 'greatly underspecified';68 that is, we still need to specify
the conditions or procedural details of the game, such as (i) the selection of the
interrogator, (ii) whether any restrictions are to be placed on the type of questions
the interrogator is allowed to ask; (iii) whether Players A and B may ask questions
of each other; (iv) the amount of questioning allowed to occur and the length of
time over which such questioning takes place, and (v) the number of independent
sessions or trials of the game that are run. For example, with respect to condition
(v) above, one can imagine a Turing-Test system in which the same game is played
a number of times, with a completely different interrogator each time the game
is played, in order to see whether the individual interrogators, as a group, form a
consensus as to Player B's guilt or level of liability.
These conditions or procedural details are clearly very important and
deserve special attention. But instead of trying to specify these conditions or
details platonically or paternalistically from the top-down, we would propose a
decentralised ('bottom-up') market-based method. Specifically, we would propose
an annual or biennial competition, like the Loebner Prize in the field of artificial
intelligence or the Venice Biennial in the arts, in which the contestants would specify
the conditions of the Turing Litigation Game by proposing competing versions
of the game. The competition would award monetary prizes to those contestants
who submitted the best game design, with the contestants themselves, as a group,
selecting the winners. Over a number of years, this competitive process would
produce a corpus of Turing games that could then be tried and implemented on
an experimental basis.69
In any event, however the conditions of the game are specified, it is worth
noting that our approach to adjudication, the Turing Litigation Game, like the
Turing Test itself, is probabilistic in nature. Return, for a moment, to condition (v)
above, i.e. the number of trials a given Turing litigation game should be run. This
condition implies that a Turing game is not a one-shot game or one-off event but
instead a series of independent trials. In some trials of the game, Player B may be
found guilty; in other trials, however, he may be found not guilty. But over a long
68
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See, e.g., Oppy and Dowe, supra note 55, at 35.
For instance, in addition to the existing mediation and arbitration options that are
already widely available in many jurisdictions, the litigants in an actual case (civil or
criminal) could also be given the option of submitting their case to a specified Turing
procedure. But unlike a mediator or arbitrator, who may be biased (depending on
which party is financing the mediation or arbitration process), the interrogator/judge
in the Turing model would be a public good financed by the state.
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enough series of trial runs, a relative-frequency value or 'consensus value' as to
the defendant's status should emerge.
Likewise, although the probabilistic nature of the Turing Test is often
overlooked,n his test is a probabilistic one because a given level of success by
Player A in the imitation game (i.e. the number of times that Player A is able
to trick or deceive Player C, the interrogator, or viewed from the perspective of
the interrogator, the relative frequency of incorrect guesses by the interrogator)
produces "a specifiable level of increase in confidence that the participant in question
[PlayerA Iis intelligent" 71 or is a man (in the original version of the imitation game).

That is, when we look at the original formulation of the Turing Test in Turing's
1950 paper, "it is clear that [Turing] thought that the passing of the test [by player A]
would provide probabilisticsupportfor the hypothesis of intelligence" 72

This point (i.e. the probabilistic nature of the Turing Test) has important
implications for law and legal process. In place of the existing procedural system,
which relies on binary or 'YES/NO" ('all-or-nothing') determinations of civil
and criminal liability (in which the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of
committing a given wrongful act), we can now imagine a probabilistic test for
determining liability in which the interrogator provides a probabilistic assessment
of defendant's guilt. In other words, instead of asking the interrogator/judge in the
Turing Litigation Game to issue Yes/No verdicts regarding Player B's liability, the
interrogator/judge would provide a probabilistic verdict regarding the likelihood
of Player B's liability given the responses of Players A and B to the interrogator's
questions.73
But why do we emphasise the probabilistic nature of the Turing Test and take
such a probabilistic approach to legal process? Because, in reality, the 'litigation
game' is itself a probabilistic process. In a word, we can never know with absolute
certainty whether a given defendant has committed a wrongful act. That is, seen
from a probabilistic perspective, the defendant's guilt or level of liability is not a
binary or YES/NO proposition (i.e. a proposition which must be true or false; either
70
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For example, "Igive a 75% probability to the truth of player A's claim or player A's

charge," or stated in the alternative, "I give a 25% probability that the defendant has
not committed a wrongful act".

A Simple Thought-E:-periment:Turing Games with a Unified Code of Procedure
0 or 1); it is instead a mere conjecture, a hypothesis with a continuous probability
distribution from 0 to 1.
Since we can never know with absolute certainty whether a given defendant
has committed a wrongful act, why do we continue to pretend under the existing
rules of procedure that liability is a binary proposition? When there are conflicting
versions of the facts, or when the law is indeterminate, it is incorrect to say that a
particular defendant is either 'guilty or not guilty'; instead, one should say "there
is some positive probability p that the defendant has committed a wrongful act'. This
probability is, in turn, based on the state of the law (what actions constitute a
'wrongful act' under the law) and on the evidence presented at trial (the facts of the
case). The clearer the law is and the stronger the evidence is, the higher p will be7 4
Summing up, our approach to litigation reflects the true inherent uncertainty
and true probabilistic nature of the legal process itself. By taking a probabilistic
approach to legal process (i.e. by allowing the interrogator/judge in the Turing
Litigation Game to issue probabilistic verdicts), we would substitute binary YES/
NO verdicts of liability (e.g., 'guilty' or 'not guilty'), or liability versus no liability,
with probabilistic verdicts in which the defendant's liability is expressed as a
probability (e.g., "the defendant has committed a wrongful act with probability p").
Thus far, we have only discussed the 'liability phase' of civil and criminal
cases. But before proceeding, it is worth noting that our analysis also applies to the
damages and sentencing phases as well. That is, if the determination of a defendant's
liability is probabilistic in nature, then the damages to be paid or the sentence to
be served should likewise be discounted (i.e. reduced) by the probability that the.
defendant has committed a wrongful act. For example, if the interrogator/judge
is only 75% certain that a defendant is guilty, then the defendant's punishment,
whether measured in monetary units (damages) or time units (a prison sentence),
should be reduced by the same pro rata amount to reflect this uncertainty.'
What if the interrogator is less than 50% certain of the defendant's guilt?
Should the same discounting principle apply to the defendant's punishment, or
should the defendant receive no punishment if p (probability of guilt) falls below
74
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some threshold level, such as 0.9 (in criminal cases) and 0.5 (in civil cases)? Again,
instead of attempting to answer these questions platonically or paternalistically
from the top-down, we would propose a market-based method or prize competition
for solving these problems, such as the Loebner Prize or Hutter Prize in the field of
artificial intelligence. In the meantime, until these difficult questions are answered,
our Turing litigation game should be viewed as a 'thought-experiment' of what
an ideal unified procedural system would look like.
V. CONCLUSION
The Republic of India is not only the most populous and diverse democracy
in the family of nations; it is also the globe's largest 'common law' country.
Paradoxically, then, although India is one of the most geographically heterogeneous
countries in the world with a wide variety of peoples and languages, cultures
and climates, its legal system is largely homogenous: the legal language in India
is English and India's legal system is based in great part on the Anglo-American
'common law' model. 6 But legal scholars have long lamented the pervasive
problems of 'overload and arrears' in India's legal system,7 yet few scholars have
proposed any sweeping or systemic solutions to the problem. Does the problem
of delay thus defy solution, or is this problem in principle soluble? We offer the
following thought-experiment as a possible solution to the problem of delay: Turing
litigation games with a unified code of procedure.
In summary, in this paper we have provided a brief survey of the problem of
delay in India's legal system, reviewed some previous diagnoses of the problem,
and explained why these previous explanations are off the mark. Moreover, we
presented an alternative diagnosis of the problem of delay in India: the main
sources of arrears in India are India's complex, formalistic, and open-ended codes
of civil and criminal procedure. That is, our hypothesis is that the codes of civil
and criminal procedure in India are far too complex, formalistic, and open-ended,
and it is these high levels of complexity, formalism, and ambiguity in India's codes
of civil and criminal procedure, more than any other factors, that produce suboptimal levels of delay in India's legal system.
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A Simple Thought-Experiment: Turing Games with a Unified Code of Procedure
Accordingly, we have presented a novel solution to the problem of delay:
the use of Turing litigation games based on a 'Unified Code of Procedure' - that
is, a single set of simple procedural rules for civil and criminal cases alike. For
example, in his classic work on the Indian legal system, Professor Baxi proposes
that "laws should be, as far as possible, drafted in a manner that is simple and intelligible
to all people affected by the law"." We agree. But we would add that simplicity is not
just a virtue in the domain of substantive law; it is also a virtue in the domain of
procedural rules.79 We would thus extend the principle of simplicity to the rules
of procedure. Turing games would pass this test.
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